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Beyond team-directed reasoning:
Participatory intentions contribute to a
theory of collective agency
Hein Duijf
Abstract
Philosophical accounts of collective intentionality typically rely onmem-
bers to form a personal intention of sorts, viewed as a mental state. This
tendency is opposed by recent economic literature on team-directed rea-
soning (as studied by Bacharach, Gold, and Sugden), which focuses on
the reasoning process leading up to the formation of the members’ inten-
tions. Our formal analysis bridges these paradigms and criticizes the team-
directed reasoning account on two counts: first, team-directed reasoning is
supposed to transcend traditional game and decision theory by adopting
a certain collectivistic reasoning method. However, we show that team-
directed reasoning yields the same action recommendations as a certain
I-mode we-intention type. Accordingly, an important part of we-mode rea-
soning can be reduced to I-mode reasoning with certain preferences. Sec-
ond, contrary to the claims of team-directed-reasoning theorists, we refute
that team-directed reasoning surpasses pro-group intentions in selecting
cooperatively rational solutions. That is, in some scenarios team-directed
reasoning fails to guarantee successful cooperation whereas pro-group in-
tentions succeed in doing so. We therefore propose to revise team-directed
reasoning and introduce a third we-intention type, called participatory in-
tentions. We prove that participatory intentions guarantee that a best group
action is performedwhenever either team-directed reasoning or pro-group
intentions do.
Keywords: Team-directed Reasoning · Collective Agency · Participatory
Intentions · We-intentions · Game Theory
1 Introduction
The philosophical debate on collective intentionality has recently been enriched
by the economics literature on team-directed reasoning (see Gold and Sugden
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2007, Hakli et al. 2010).1 On the one hand, various philosophical accounts rely
onmembers to form a personal intention of sorts.2 On the other hand, it has been
proposed that the economic literature on team-directed reasoning (Bacharach
1999; 2006, Sugden 1993; 2000; 2003) can be applied to gain a better understand-
ing of collective intentionality (Gold and Sugden 2007, Hakli et al. 2010). In-
stead of relying on members’ personal intentions, the latter approach appeals
to the reasoning process leading up to the formation of the intention and argues
that this focus is needed to grasp collective intentionality. In short, philoso-
phers focus on the intentions of the members, while economists focus on their
reasoning process. We discuss these accounts in reverse order.
To explain team-directed reasoning and to contrast it with traditional game
and decision theory, let us consider the Hi-Lo game depicted in Figure 1. It
seems that (high, high) is the only rational solution, but if the players in this
game are guided by traditional game and decision theory, they have no reason
for preferring one action over the other: when applying individualistic domi-
nance reasoning, the row player sees that high is a best response to high and low
is a best response to low. At best, individual dominance reasoning gives her con-
ditional recommendations: to, for instance, choose low if she expects the other
player to choose low. At worst, it gives her an indeterminate unconditional rec-
ommendation. Similar objections apply to expected utility theory. Instead, one
may want to apply Nash equilibrium reasoning: it follows from (high, high) and
(low, low) being the only pure Nash equilibria that Nash equilibrium reason-
ing also fails to give a determinate recommendation. As a response to this, one
may want to refine the Nash equilibria by appealing to the Pareto dominance
of (high, high) over (low, low) in order to select the equilibrium (high, high) as
the only rational solution.3 In any case, such a Nash equilibrium only captures
a possible status-quo: if everyone expected the others to play their part in the
Nash equilibrium, then they would have a reason to do the same. It hence gives
only a conditional recommendation and triggers an infinite regress of reasons.4
This inadequate response to the Hi-Lo game by traditional game and decision
theory stands to be corrected, which is what team-directed reasoning (as stud-
ied by Bacharach, Sugden, and Gold) has been designed for.
Bacharach (2006, Ch. 1) and Sugden (2000, Sections 2, 3, 7 and 8) argue that
traditional game and decision theory needs to be augmented with a collectivis-
1Although Bacharach (2006), Gold and Sugden (2007) call their approach ‘team reasoning’, we
follow Sugden (2000) and refer to it as ‘team-directed reasoning’ to emphasize that this is a mode
of reasoning of an individual agent, not of a team.
2Philosophical accounts of collective intentionality build on participatory intentions (Kutz 2000),
contributory intentions (discussed and rejected by Gilbert (2009)), intentions that we J (Bratman
2014), and we-intentions (Tuomela 2000; 2005, Searle 1990).
3Harsanyi and Selten (1988) argue for Pareto dominance as a principle of equilibrium selection.
4Sugden (2000, pp. 179–182) and Bacharach (2006, pp. 35–68) providemore elaborate treatments
of these objections to traditional game and decision theory.
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high low
high (2,2) (0,0)
low (0,0) (1,1)
Figure 1: The Hi-Lo game.
tic reasoning method to successfully address the Hi-Lo game. Team-directed
reasoning appeals to the reasoning process by which an individual agent reasons
about what to do. An individual agent engaged in team-directed reasoning
“works out the best feasible combination of actions for all the members of her
team, then does her part in it” (Bacharach 2006, p. 121). In the Hi-Lo game, this
reasoning goes as follows: the row player first identifies (high, high) as the best
combination of individual actions that they can perform and then decides to
perform her part in that combination, i.e. high.5 Similar reasoning prescribes
high for the column player. Team-directed reasoning hence entails that high is
the only rational option, and in turn selects (high, high) as the only rational out-
come. Problem solved.
Philosophical theories of collective intentionality typically rely on the mem-
bers to form personal intentions of sorts. We focus on Tuomela’s philosophical
theory of sociality (Tuomela 2000; 2005; 2006; 2007), which relies on the distinc-
tion between the I-mode and the we-mode, which encompasses reasoning, act-
ing, and possiblymore: “Thewe-mode involves functioning as a groupmember
and not as a private person while the I-mode is concerned only with function-
ing as a private person” (Tuomela 2006, p. 49). Following Hakli et al. (2010,
pp. 315–318), it is useful to divide the we-mode reasoning process up into three
stages: the first results in the formation of “a group preference matrix”, the sec-
ond reaches “a joint intention to act”, and in the third “the agents select their
part-actions”.6 We focus solely on the third stage of the we-mode reasoning
process.
Our study is thus cast against the background of collective intentional action
and focuses on the members’ personal intentions, which we call we-intentions
because they relate to a collective intention. It is important to note that a we-
5Team reasoning is generally taken to presuppose a group preference (see Bacharach 1999, Sug-
den 2000). In the team-reasoning literature there has been some discussion on the relation between
the group preference and the individual preferences. For example, Bacharach “allowed in principle
that the group objective might be welfare decreasing for some members” (Gold 2012, p. 195) and
according to Sugden (2000, p. 176) “the preferences of a team are not necessarily reducible to, or
capable of being constructed out of, the preferences that govern the choices that the members of
the team make as individuals.” Nonetheless, for the current Hi-Lo game, it is uncontroversial that
the group prefers (high, high) over (low, low).
6Hakli et al. (2010, p. 318) extensively discuss these three stages and argue that the result of the
first stage is common knowledge, but the latter two “can be performed by the individual agents
autonomously as generally supposed in non-cooperative game theory”.
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intention can be held in the I-mode or in the we-mode. For our purposes, the
notions of pro-group I-mode and we-mode in decision making are essential.
The pro-group I-mode is concerned with promoting the group’s in-
terests. (Hakli et al. 2010, p. 296)
That is, a pro-group I-mode agent transforms her preferences and adopts
the group’s objectives as if they were her own personal objectives. Then she
decides what to do by way of individualistic reasoning. In such a case, we say
that she forms a pro-group intention, meaning that she intends to further the
group’s objective.7 Note that adopting a pro-group intention requires her to
take the perspective of the group agent to determine the group’s objective.8
This is the first I-mode we-intention type we consider.
We-mode reasoning and Bacharach’s team reasoning yield the same
action recommendations in game-theoretic choice situations. (Hakli
et al. 2010, p. 301)
We show that the results of team-directed reasoning can be explained by I-
mode we-intentions with a particular content, which we call team-directed inten-
tions: an individual agent having such a team-directed intention intends to per-
form an individual action that is compatible with a best group action. An agent
adopting a team-directed intention transforms her preferences and adopts as
her personal objective performing an individual action that is compatible with
a best group action. This requires her to put herself in the shoes of the group
agent to determine the best group actions. Then she decides what to do by way
of individualistic reasoning. We show that team-directed reasoning and team-
directed intentions yield the same action recommendations.9 This means that
7Compare Bacharach’s (1999, p. 128 – notation adapted) notion of a “group benefactor”: “Let us
call a type of player who reasons individualistically but whose payoff function coincides with that
of a team G a benefactor of G.” Hakli et al. (2010, p. 301) argue that “pro-group I-mode reasoning, in
cases in which agents adopt the group preferences, and Bacharach’s reasoning as a team benefactor
yield the same action recommendations.” So, a pro-group I-mode reasoner, a group benefactor,
and a pro-group intention adopter yield the same action recommendations.
8Hakli et al. (2010, Section 3.2) describe the formation of group preferences by means of we-
mode reasoning. It thus seems possible that a pro-group I-mode reasoner partially reasons in the
we-mode, though not till the very end. To be more precise, a pro-group I-mode reasoner only
follows the first stage of we-mode reasoning.
9When assuming the natural candidate for the group preference in the Hi-Lo game, the theory
of team reasoning solves the Hi-Lo game letting the agents adopt a particular reasoning method,
our theory of team intentions, instead, can be interpreted as solving the Hi-Lo game by letting the
agents adopt a particular intention.
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an important part of the distinguished we-mode reasoning can be reduced to
I-mode reasoning with a team-directed intention.10
Our characterization of team-directed reasoning by way of team-directed
intentions reveals that it is surprisingly weak. Indeed, a team-directed inten-
tion requires an individual agent to perform an individual action that is only
compatible with a best group action. Reform is required. Therefore, we intro-
duce a third I-mode we-intention type: participatory intentions, which require
an individual agent to promote the realization of a best group action.11 That is,
she adopts as her objective that a best group action is performed.12 As with
team-directed intentions, the agent is required to take the group perspective
to determine the best group actions. Then she decides what to do by way of
individualistic reasoning.
In this paper we investigate the classes of games for which these three (I-
mode)we-intentions – pro-group, team-directed, and participatory intentions –
guarantee successful cooperation. The action recommendations resulting from
these we-intention types are derived by means of individualistic reasoning: we
adopt the intuition that an agent should avoid inadmissible, i.e. dominated, ac-
tions. Our results, depicted in Figure 2, are two-fold: (1) Pro-group intentions
and team-directed intentions are on a par: in some scenarios team-directed in-
tentions succeed in guaranteeing that a cooperatively rational solution is se-
lected whereas pro-group intentions fail to do so, and vice versa. The class of
games for which team-directed intentions guarantee successful cooperation is
hence not a proper superset of the corresponding class for pro-group intentions,
and vice versa. (2) Participatory intentions surpass both pro-group intentions
and team-directed intentions: in any scenario, if either team-directed or pro-
group intentions guarantee that a best group action is performed, then so do
participatory intentions. Or, equivalently, the class of games for which partic-
ipatory intentions guarantee successful cooperation is a superset of both the
corresponding class for pro-group intentions and the corresponding class for
team-directed intentions. Our theory of participatory intentions is therefore the
prevalent account of cooperation.
10This opposes Hakli et al. (2010, Thesis (5) on p. 307): “We-mode reasoning is not reducible to
pro-group I-mode reasoning, i.e. it is not definable by or functionally constructable from I-mode
reasoning.” These opposing results derive from the fact that Hakli et al. (2010) assume that I-mode
reasoning is connected to equilibrium-based reasoning, whereas we assume that I-mode reasoning
is connected to dominance reasoning.
11Our use of the term ‘participatory intentions’ is inspired by Kutz (2000), although we do not
study the relation between our notions. Kutz writes: “On the one hand, collective activity is an
ineliminable part of the content of agents’ participatory intentions. [. . . ] On the other hand, partic-
ipatory intentions are simply a special class of ordinary intentions, differentiated by their group-
oriented content” (pp. 85–86). He thus has in mind a kind of I-mode we-intention.
12Note the minor, yet crucial difference: pro-group intentions require the individual agent to
adopt the group’s preferences as her own, whereas a participatory intention can be viewed as requir-
ing the individual agent to adopt as her personal objective that a best group action is performed.
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Participatory Intentions
Team-
directed
Intentions
Pro-group
Intentions
Figure 2: Selecting cooperatively rational outcomes: each of the three areas de-
picts the class of games for which the respective intention type guarantees suc-
cessful cooperation.
To achieve all of this, we present a formal analysis. In Section 2 we intro-
duce game-theoreticmodels and the admissibility requirement, which captures
the intuition that one should avoid dominated actions. We then extend tra-
ditional game forms with intentions. Based on these models, we introduce a
modal logic of agency and intentionality in Section 3. This language includes
group-STIT13 operators [H stit]ϕ expressing that ‘group H sees to it that ϕ’,
operators [H prom]ϕ expressing that ‘group H promotes ϕ’, and intention op-
erators [H int]ϕ expressing that ‘group H intends to ϕ’. In Section 4 we use
this language to accurately characterize team-directed intentions, and show
that they yield the same action recommendations as team-directed reasoning.
In Section 5 we show that, in the context of group G’s collective intention to
ϕ, i.e. [G int]ϕ, this language allows us to accurately distinguish between the
three previously mentioned we-intention types: pro-group intentions [i int]ϕ,
team-directed intentions [i int]〈i stit〉[G prom]ϕ, and participatory intentions
[i int][G prom]ϕ. In Section 6 we raise our objection to team-directed inten-
tions: we provide a game in which pro-group intentions succeed in guaran-
teeing successful cooperation whereas team-directed intentions fail to do so.
More importantly, in Section 7 we establish that the class of games for which
participatory intentions guarantee successful cooperation is a superset of both
the corresponding class for pro-group intentions and the corresponding class
for team-directed intentions. Our theory of participatory intentions therefore
surpasses both team-directed reasoning andpro-group intentions in explaining
and predicting cooperative behaviour. Finally, we conclude with a discussion
in Section 8.
13The acronym STIT stands for ‘seeing to it that’. The Chellas STIT operator that we use was
introduced by Chellas (1992).
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2 Games, intentions, and admissibility
We use strategic games to study and highlight the differences between various
we-intention types and team-directed reasoning. A strategic game describes a
strategic scenario involving a finite setN of individual agents. Each individual
agent i is assigned a finite set of available actions Ai. The Cartesian product∏
i∈N Ai of all individual agents’ sets of available actions gives the full set A of
action profiles.
Definition 1 (Strategic game form). A strategic game form S is a tuple 〈N , (Ai)〉,
whereN is a finite set of individual agents and for each agent i inN it holds that Ai is
a non-empty and finite set of actions available to agent i. The set of action profiles in S
is A =
∏
i∈N Ai.14
For each group G ⊆ N the set of available group actions, denoted by AG ,
is the Cartesian product
∏
i∈G Ai of the available individual group members’
actions. We use aG and a′G as variables for group actions in the setAG , and omit
subscripts for action profiles from A. Given a group action aG and a subgroup
F ⊆ G, we let aF denote the subgroup action that is F ’s component subgroup
action of the group action aG . Conclusively, we use −G to denote the relative
complement N − G.
To study various types of we-intentions, we need to extend these strategic
game forms to include intentions. Though philosophers have studied various
guises of intentions, we restrict our attention to future-directed intentions as
studied in the planning theory of intentions advanced by Bratman (1987).15
There are two different types of future-directed intentions: I can intend to per-
form a certain action, or I can intend to realize a certain state of affairs. We focus
primarily on intentions to realize a certain state of affairs. We assume that an
action profile fully determines the future state of the world.16 An intention is
then identified with a set of action profiles. Intuitively, an intention J ⊆ A is
an intention to realize the aspects that all outcomes of the action profiles in J
have in common. We restrict to agents having just one single intention. So the
intention of an – individual or collective – agent H is given by a set of action
14Note the absence of payoffs or utilities. In this paper we focus on the agents’ intentions, which
will be added in Definition 2. In game-theoretic terms such a strategic game form is a game form. A
game, in contrast, also includes a vector of numerical payoffs, one for each individual agent.
15These future-directed intentions (such as my intention to submit this paper by the end of the
month) have been distinguished from intentions in action (such as my typing with the intention
to finish this introduction) and intentional acts (such as my typing these words intentionally) (see
Anscombe (1963)).
16In this regard, our framework is very similar to that of van Hees and Roy (2008). Alternatively,
if one wants to retain indeterminism, an agent called ‘nature’ can be added to model the indetermi-
nacy. That is, once every agent has made her choice, the exact outcome is determined by nature’s
move.
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profiles IntH. This induces the reading that an agentH intends to ϕ if and only
if her intention IntH is represented by ϕ. To model that rational intentions are
feasible, we require that IntH 6= ∅.
Definition 2 (Strategic gamewith intentions). A strategic gamewith intentions
(SGI) S is a tuple 〈N , (Ai), (IntH)〉 where 〈N , (Ai)〉 is a strategic game form, and, for
every group of agentsH, IntH is a non-empty set of profiles from A (so IntH ⊆ A \ ∅).
In picturing the intentions, we often use utilities (uH) where
uH(a) =
1, if a ∈ IntH0, otherwise.17
To interpret our logical language that will be introduced in Section 3, an SGI is
extended to a strategic model with intentions (SMI) by adding a propositional val-
uation pi : A→ 2P (where P is the set of propositional letters).
Intentions provide a “filter of admissibility for options” (Bratman 1987, p. 33,
emphasis in original). AlthoughBratmandoes not use this term in anydecision-
theoretic sense, we accept the intuition that an agent intending to ϕ is required
to avoid inadmissible actions, i.e. avoid dominated actions.18 Admissibility cap-
tures the idea that an agent takes all actions for the other agents into considera-
tion; none is entirely ruled out.19 Avoiding inadmissible actions is more restric-
tive than avoiding strictly dominated actions. Admissibility has a long tradition
in decision theory (see the discussion in Kohlberg and Mertens (1986, Section
2.7)). Therefore we take ‘providing a filter of admissibility’ to mean that our
intentions require us to choose an admissible action, i.e. one that is not domi-
nated.20
17Although our conceptual analysis involves intentions, a decision theorist can view our formal
analysis as being restricted to only binary utility functions.
18In their axiomatic approach to decision theory, Luce and Raiffa (1957, see Section 13.3, and
p. 306) express the admissibility requirement in Axiom 5 and write: “Axioms 1 through 5, and to a
lesser extent 6, seem quite innocuous and, so far as we are aware, all serious proposals for criteria
satisfy them.”
19Selten (1975) argues that even rational players, having made their choice, may with non-zero
probability do something else by accident. In addition, Pearce (1984, Lemma 4) shows that an action
is admissible if and only if it maximizes expected utility with respect to a probability function that
assigns positive probability to every move of the opponent. This means that an expected utility
maximizer should avoid inadmissible actions.
20Note that we do not employ iterated admissibility, i.e. iterated deletion of dominated actions
(see the discussion in Kohlberg and Mertens (1986, Section 2.7) and the discussion of epistemic
characterizations of iterated admissibility in Brandenburger et al. (2008, Section 2.6)). One of the
main reasons for refraining fromdoing so is that iterated admissibility is subject to some paradoxes:
for instance, it is well known that the order in which dominated strategies are eliminated can affect
the outcome of the process. Furthermore, we believe the core results (Results 1 through 4) of this
paper are sustained if iterated admissibility is taken to entail that inadmissible actions are avoided.
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In decision theory it is common to derive this dominance ordering from
exogenously given utilities. Here, however, we are interested in the dominance
orderings resulting from the endogenously adopted intentions. We therefore
submit that a dominance ordering is relative to a certain intention. A group
action aG is admissible with respect to an intention to J if and only if no other
group action promotes the realization of J , regardless of what the group’s non-
members do, better than aG does. So we require that an agent intending to ϕ
should also promote ϕ, that is, should perform an action that is admissible with
respect to ϕ.
Since we only consider intentions to realize a state of affairs, the adopted
dominance ordering is relative to the realization of some state of affairs, in-
stead of maximizing payoffs, as is usual in traditional game and decision the-
ory.21 Our dominance ordering is therefore explicitly relative to a certain state
of affairs. Moreover, note that altering the state of affairs impacts the result-
ing dominance ordering. In decision-theoretic terms, I may want to optimize
my own happiness, but I could instead aim at optimizing our collective, per-
haps average or minimum, happiness; pursuing these different states of affairs
may result in different dominance orderings. Still, the principle by which the
dominance ordering results from a certain state of affairs is uniform.
The principle guiding the dominance orderings combines the sure-thing
principle and reasoning by cases.22 More specifically, a group action aG weakly
dominates a′G with respect to a certain state of affairs if and only if aG promotes
realizing that state of affairs at least as well as a′G , regardless of what the group’s
non-members do:
Definition 3 (Admissibility). Let S = 〈N , (Ai)〉 be a strategic game form. Let
J ⊆ A be a state of affairs. A group action aG weakly dominates a′G with respect
to J , notation aG J a′G , if and only if for all actions a′′−G ∈ A−G we have that
(a′G , a
′′
−G) ∈ J implies (aG , a′′−G) ∈ J . Dominance, notation J , is derived from
weak dominance: aG J a′G if and only if aG J a′G and aG J a′G . A group action
aG is admissible with respect to J if and only if it is not dominated with respect to
J by any group action in AG .
When we represent the intention by a binary utility function rather than a
set of possible worlds, this definition translates to: aG J a′G if and only if for all
21However, note that, although we refrain from modelling beliefs and degrees of beliefs, these
are intimately related as we interchangeably model the intentions by using a set of possible worlds
and a utility function (see Definition 2).
22Savage (1954, p. 21) writes: “I know of no other extralogical principle governing decisions that
finds such ready acceptance.” Our personal inspiration is from Horty (1996; 2001), who provided
a similar analysis in deontic logic, which is the formal study of obligations and permissions, by
introducing “an ordering on actions available to the agent through a state-by-state comparison of
their results”, where “we will identify the states confronting the agent at any given moment with
the possible patterns of actions that might be performed at that moment by all other agents” (Horty
2001, p. 67 and p. 66).
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jt1 t2 t3
i
s1 (1,1,1) (1,0,0) (0,1,1)
s2 (1,1,1) (0,0,0) (0,0,0)
s3 (1,0,0) (1,1,0) (0,0,0)
Figure 3: Strategic Game with Intentions S2, where the intentions are repre-
sented by a triple of utilities expressing i’s, j’s, and {i, j}’s intention.
a′′−G ∈ A−G we have uJ(a′G , a′′−G) ≥ uJ(aG , a′′−G) (where uJ(a) = 1 if a ∈ J and 0
otherwise). This is thus equivalent to the standard weak dominance ordering,
as studied in traditional game and decision theory.
Note that this definition implies that for every group of agents and every
state of affairs there is at least one admissible group action with respect to that
state of affairs (because A is assumed to be finite).
To illustrate this dominance ordering and admissibility, consider game S2
in Figure 3. First, note that this example illustrates that we do not presuppose
any connection between personal and group intentions. Secondly, regarding
the dominance ordering, since agent i’s intention is not realized at (s2, t2), we
can see that for agent i only actions s1 and s3 are admissible with respect to her
intention. For agent j, action t3 is dominated by t1 with respect to her intention,
while t1 and t2 are incomparable and, hence, both admissible. That is, t1 Intj
t3, t1 Intj t2, and t2 Intj t1. For the group G, consisting of agents i and j, the
admissible group actions with respect to its collective intention IntG are (s1, t1),
(s2, t1), and (s1, t3). Since we accept the intuition that an agent intending to ϕ
should avoid inadmissible actions, this means that agent i can choose s1 and
agent j can choose t2, with regard to their respective individual intention. It
follows that the individual intentions allow (s1, t2), which is inadmissible with
respect to the collective intention IntG . The individual intentions hence do not
guarantee that a best group action is performed, which is not a surprise.
3 Modal logic of agency and intentionality
To highlight the conceptual differences between the three we-intention types
discussed in the introduction, in this section we introduce a modal-logical lan-
guage. This logical language is an extension of group-STIT logics:
Definition 4 (Syntax). Given a set of propositional letters P and a set of agents N ,
the syntax is given by
ϕ ::= p | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ¬ϕ | 2ϕ | [H stit]ϕ | [H int]ϕ | [H prom]ϕ,
10
where p ranges overP andH ranges over subsets ofN . Standard abbreviations are used
for dual versions of the modal operators, for example3ϕ↔ ¬2¬ϕ and 〈H stit〉ϕ↔
¬[H stit]¬ϕ.
We briefly discuss intuitive readings of these operators before considering
the respective formal semantics and providing a more detailed conceptual dis-
cussion. Formulas of this language are interpreted at action profiles. The cen-
tral agency operator is the modality [H stit]ϕ, which stands for ‘groupH sees
to it that ϕ holds’. Modalities [H int]ϕ and [H prom]ϕ are interpreted as ‘group
H intends to ϕ’ and ‘group H promotes ϕ’, respectively. The modality 2ϕ is a
universalmodality and is therefore interpreted as ‘ϕ holds at any action profile’.
Themodels and the dominance ordering, presented in the previous section, are
used to provide formal semantics for this logical language by using truth con-
ditions for the syntactic clauses:
Definition 5 (Semantics). Let S = 〈N , (Ai), (IntH), pi〉 be an SMI, and H ⊆ N be
a group of agents. The truth conditions are given by a recursive definition:
S, a  p ⇔ p ∈ pi(a)
S, a  ϕ ∧ ψ ⇔ S, a  ϕ and S, a  ψ
S, a  2ϕ ⇔ every b ∈ A satisfies S, b  ϕ
S, a  [H stit]ϕ ⇔ every b ∈ A with bH = aH satisfies S, b  ϕ
S, a  [H prom]ϕ ⇔ aH is admissible with respect to {b | S, b  ϕ}23
S, a  [H int]ϕ ⇔ we have IntH = {b | S, b  ϕ}.24
These semantics implement the idea from STIT theories that ‘the agent sees
to it that ϕ’ means that the truth of ϕ is guaranteed by an action or choice of
the agent. When Ann empties her glass of milk, the nature of her action on
this view is to constrain the possible worlds to those where the glass of milk is
emptied. Hence, an action ai is identified with a subset of the possible worlds,
namely those action profiles b satisfying bi = ai. This induces the reading that
an agent sees to it that ϕ only if she performs an action ai, thereby constraining
the possible worlds to only ϕ-worlds.
It may be useful to add that the STITmodality [H stit]ϕ can be interpreted,
relative to a profile a, as ‘group H guarantees that ϕ holds regardless of what
23A technical remark: the semantics for the [H prom] operator could also have been given by
neighbourhood semantics, where the neighbourhoods for a groupH of a profile awould be given
by the collection {M ⊆ A | aH is admissible with respect toM}.
24Note the equality sign, which means that we employ neighbourhood semantics. If we had em-
ployed the standard possible worlds semantics, it would have read ‘IntH consists only ofϕ-worlds’,
meaning IntH ⊆ {a ∈ A | a satisfies ϕ}. Konolige and Pollack (1993) were the first to model inten-
tions using neighbourhood semantics instead of the standard possible worlds semantics.
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the others do’. Indeed, the truth condition of S, a  [H stit]ϕ is equivalent to
requiring that for every b−H ∈ A−H we have S, (aH, b−H)  ϕ. This reveals that
the group has enough control to ensure ϕ.
The dual STIT modality 〈H stit〉ϕ expresses that ‘group H allows for ϕ’,
that is, groupH’s action does not rule out ϕ. At a profile a ∈ A, this means that
there is an action profile b−H ∈ A−H for the others such that S, (aH, b−H)  ϕ.
Or, equivalently, action aH is compatible with ϕ.
The modality [H prom]ϕ expresses that the group H performs a best group
actionwith respect to realizingϕ, where ‘best’ is equatedwith ‘admissible’. The
underlying intuition is that there may be multiple best actions, each of which
is admissible. So, this operator expresses that group H avoids actions that are
inadmissible with respect to ϕ. This operator hence refers to admissibility, as
introduced in Definition 3.25 Our intuition that an agent intending to ϕ is re-
quired to avoid actions that are inadmissible with respect to ϕ, thus means that
an agent intending to ϕ is required to promote ϕ.
The semantics of the intention operator emphasize that we only consider
intentions to realize a certain state of affairs, which is represented by a set of
worlds. The truth condition for [H int]ϕ employs neighbourhood semantics
and thus induces the reading that the group’s intention is represented by ϕ.
These neighbourhood semantics are usually employed to avoid problems con-
cerning logical omniscience, that is, to avoid intentions being closed under logi-
cal implications.26 Ourmotivation is different: we accepted the intuition that an
agent intending to ϕ is required to avoid inadmissible actions. But if  ϕ→ ψ,
then an action that is admissible with respect to ϕ need not be admissible with
respect to ψ.27 So if the agent’s intention is closed under logical implications,
this will result in a practical dilemma: she cannot perform an action that is both
admissible with regard to her initial intention and admissible with regard to all
its logical consequences.
Since our aim is to contribute to a conceptual analysis of collective agency,
and team-directed reasoning in particular, a complete logical investigation is
well beyond our current ambition. Still, it is useful for our current purposes to
examine some logical properties of the multi-modal logic we have introduced:
25A similar operator has been used by Broersen (2011) to model attempts. Whereas he uses max-
imizing expected utility, we adopted admissibility as the underlying decision principle. However,
although there might be some connections to attempts, here we do not want to argue that our
[H prom]-operator adequately models attempts.
26For this reason, Konolige and Pollack (1993, p. 178) use neighbourhood semantics to model
intentions.
27To see this, reconsider the SGI S2 in Figure 3: We have already noticed that s3 is admissible
with respect to Inti. However, s3 fails to be admissible with respect to Inti ∪ {(s1, t3)}, since s1
dominates s3 with respect to Inti ∪ {(s1, t3)}.
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Proposition 1. Let ϕ be any formula in our language, and letH be a group of agents,
possibly a singleton. Then
1.  3[H prom]ϕ, one is always able to promote ϕ,
2. 2 [H prom]ϕ→ [H stit]ϕ, promoting ϕ does not entail ensuring ϕ,
3.  [H stit]ϕ→ [H prom]ϕ, guaranteeing ϕ entails promoting ϕ,
4.  [H prom]ϕ ∧ 3ϕ → 〈H stit〉ϕ, promoting ϕ while ϕ is possible entails
allowing ϕ,
5.  [H prom]ϕ ∧ 3[H stit]ϕ → [H stit]ϕ, promoting ϕ while being able to
ensure ϕ entails guaranteeing ϕ,
6.  3[H stit]ϕ → ([H prom]ϕ ↔ [H stit]ϕ), if one is able to guarantee ϕ,
then promoting ϕ is equivalent to ensuring ϕ
Proof. Let S = 〈N , (Ai), (IntH), pi〉 be any SMI.
1. Follows from the fact that we only consider finite strategic games.
2. The previous item shows that if this were a validity, then  3[i stit]ϕwould
follow. In otherwords, one is always able to ensureϕ, nomatter its logical form.
This is, however, not always the case.
3. Suppose S, a  [H stit]ϕ. Then for any c−H ∈ A−H we have S, (aH, c−H) 
ϕ. Hence for any b ∈ A and any c−H ∈ A−H we have that S, (bH, c−H)  ϕ
implies S, (aH, c−H)  ϕ. In other words, aH ϕ bH, so aH is admissible with
respect to ϕ.
4. Suppose S, a  [H prom]ϕ∧3ϕ. Then there is a profile, say b, such that S, b 
ϕ. We argue by contradiction that S, a  〈H stit〉ϕ: suppose S, a 2 〈H stit〉ϕ.
Then for any c−H ∈ A−H we have S, (aH, c−H) 2 ϕ. Hence, for any c−H ∈ A−H
we have that S, (aH, c−H)  ϕ implies S, (bH, c−H)  ϕ, vacuously, i.e. bH ϕ
aH. Moreover, since S, b  ϕ, we have bH ϕ aH and therefore bH ϕ aH. This
shows that aH is not admissible with respect to ϕ, which contradicts with our
assumption that S, a  [H prom]ϕ.
5. We argue by contradiction. Suppose S, a  [H prom]ϕ and S, b  [H stit]ϕ,
yetS, a 2 [H stit]ϕ. Recall from the proof of item3 thatS, b  [H stit]ϕ entails
that bH weakly dominates every group action. In particular, aH ϕ bH. Our
assumption that S, a 2 [H stit]ϕ gives a c−H ∈ A−H such that S, (aH, c−H) 
¬ϕ. In particular, S, (bH, c−H)  ϕ implies S, (aH, c−H)  ϕ does not hold.
Hence aH ≺ϕ bH, which contradicts S, a  [H prom]ϕ.
6. Follows immediately from the previous item and item 3

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Item 1 establishes that one is always able to promoteϕ, irrespective of its log-
ical form. The fact that this includes infeasible properties, in particular logical
inconsistencies, may seem unsatisfactory; however, for infeasible ϕ it does not
matter what one does, because one’s choice of action does not change the fact
that ϕ will not be realized. Items 2 and 3 show that guaranteeing ϕ is logically
stronger than promoting ϕ. Item 4 expresses that if ϕ is feasible, promoting ϕ
entails that one performs an action that is compatible with ϕ. Or, equivalently,
if one performs an action that is incompatible withϕ, then one is surely not pro-
moting ϕ. Items 5 and 6 prove that, although promoting ϕ is logically weaker
than guaranteeing ϕ, if one is able to ensure ϕ, then promoting ϕ is equivalent
to guaranteeing ϕ. This shows that one is definitely devoted to realizing ϕ if
one promotes ϕ.
We refrain from a logical analysis of the intention operator, because our pri-
mary interest is in how intentions constrain the choice of strategy of the respec-
tive agents. Most importantly, as mentioned before, we accept that an agent
intending to ϕ is required to avoid actions that are inadmissible with respect to
ϕ. That is, an agent intending to ϕ is required to promote ϕ. Individual inten-
tions hence guarantee that individual agents choose actions that are admissible
with regard to their respective intentions. To generalize, intentions guarantee a
certain property ψ only if it is the case that whenever the agents choose actions
that are admissible with respect to their intentions, then ψ holds. It is natural to
interpret this as a counterfactual: if agent i intends to ϕ, and therefore performs
an individual action that is admissible with respect to ϕ, then ψ will hold. That
is, whenever the agent promotes ϕ then ψ will hold.
Definition 6. Let S be a SMI, let a ∈ A be a profile, let ϕ and ψ be formulas in our
logical language, and let i be an individual agent. Then we say that, in S, [i int]ϕ
guarantees ψ if and only if S, a  2([i prom]ϕ → ψ). (Note that we do not assume
S, a  [i int]ϕ.)
More generally, let G be a group of agents and let ψ and ϕi be formulas in our
language, one for each i ∈ G. Then we say that, in S, these intentions guarantee ψ if
and only if S, a  2(
∧
i∈G [i prom]ϕi → ψ).
The latter can be semantically interpreted as follows: let P be any property, which
need not be expressible in our logical language. Then we say that, in S, the intentions
{Ji}i∈G guarantee P if and only if for every b ∈ A such that bi is admissible with
respect to Ji for every i ∈ G, the property P holds at b.
Our focus, later in the paper, is going to be on whether intentions guarantee
that a best group action is performed. Since the three we-intention types – pro-
group, team-directed, and participatory intentions (see Section 5) – are intro-
duced to further cooperation, they are compared with respect to whether they
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guarantee that a best group action is performed (Section 7). This includes, for
example, a study of whether pro-group intentions guarantee that a best group
action is performed only if team-directed intentions do. (The answer turns out
to be negative, leading us to the conclusion that team-directed intentions and
pro-group intentions are on an equal footing.)
4 A reduction of team-directed reasoning to inten-
tions
As a motivation for the three I-mode we-intention types that are to be intro-
duced in Section 5, we discuss here the reduction of an important part of we-
mode reasoning to I-mode reasoning with a particular we-intention. That is,
we show that team-directed reasoning and this I-mode we-intention yield the
same action recommendations.
We henceforth presuppose a collective intention to ϕ and investigate what
team-directed reasoning and the we-intention types amount to.28 Just as an
individual agent’s intention requires her to perform an individual action that
is admissible with respect to that individual intention, a collective intention
requires the group to perform a group action that is admissible with respect
to its collective intention. Or, equivalently, the collective intention provides a
filter of admissibility for the available group actions in which the admissible
group actions are best. The group should therefore perform a group action
that promotes the realization of what is collectively intended.
To illustrate the benefit of team-directed reasoning in Strategic Games with
Intentions, consider the game depicted in Figure 4, which is inspired by the Hi-
Lo game. Note that, in the context of group G’s collective intention toϕ, the best
group action is (high, high), because it is the only group action that ensures ϕ.
An agent engaged in team-directed reasoning hence first identifies (high, high)
as the unique best group action and then decides to perform her part in that
combination, therefore recommending high to both agent i and agent j.29 So,
in this game, team-directed reasoning of individual agents i and j ensures that
group G performs a best group action.
28In our models, we henceforth highlight that the collective intention is presupposed by boldfac-
ing the utility function that represents it.
29Sugden (2003, p. 168) writes: “By ‘team reasoning, narrowly defined’ I mean a mode of rea-
soning, followed by one individual, which prescribes that he should perform his part of whichever
profile is best for the team. This mode of reasoning may be embedded in a larger logic which spec-
ifies the conditions under which team reasoning, narrowly defined, should be used. In this paper,
I will formulate such a logic, which I will call a logic of ‘team reasoning’.” Our analysis is thus
limited to ‘team reasoning, narrowly defined’; we do not study the larger logic.
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Figure 4: The alternative Hi-Lo game S3: a three-player game, where {i, j} = G
collectively intends to ϕ, showing only the intentions of i, j, and G, respectively.
To show that team-directed reasoning yields the same action recommen-
dations as a certain I-mode we-intention, we introduce team-directed intentions,
which are I-mode we-intentions with a certain type of content:
Definition 7 (Team-directed intentions). Suppose group G collectively intends toϕ.
Let i ∈ G be a member of the group G. Individual agent i’s team-directed intention is
an intention to act compatiblywith a best group action, that is, [i int]〈i stit〉[G prom]ϕ.
Anagent adopting a team-directed intention transforms her preferences and
adopts as her personal objective performing an individual action that is com-
patible with a best group action. This may require her to put herself in the
shoes of the group agent to determine the best group actions. Then she decides
what to do by way of individualistic reasoning. That is, she decides what to do
by determining the individual actions that are admissible with respect to her
team-directed intention.
To illustrate these team-directed intentions, we reconsider the alternative
Hi-Lo game S3 in Figure 4. So far, we have not discussed the individual inten-
tions in this SMI. Note that [G stit]ϕ only holds in (high, high, u1) and (high,
high, u2), so [G prom]ϕ also only holds in those profiles (see Proposition 1 item
6). This entails that 〈i stit〉[G prom]ϕ is only satisfied in profiles where i’s com-
ponent is high, which is exactly those in which i’s component in the utility triple
equals 1. Hence, in the alternativeHi-Lo game S3, agent i has the team-directed
intention [i int]〈i stit〉[G prom]ϕ. It can be similarly shown that j has the team-
directed intention.
An individual agent performs an action that is admissible with respect to
her team-directed intention if and only if she performs an individual action
that is her component of a best combination of actions that the members can
perform. Although the team reasoning literaturemostly presupposes that there
is a unique best group action, we follow Bacharach (1999, p. 120 – adapted no-
tation): “I shall say that agent i team reasons (for G) when she first computes
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a best profile a∗ (in terms of uG), next computes a∗i , and lastly decides to do
a∗i because this is the component under her control of a best profile.” It is un-
surprising that actions resulting from team-directed reasoning coincide with
actions admissible with respect to the team-directed intention:
Result 1. Let S = 〈N , (Ai), (IntH), pi〉 be an SMI. Suppose group G collectively
intends to ϕ. Let a ∈ A. Then team-directed reasoning admits the individual action
ai if and only if S, a  〈i stit〉[G prom]ϕ, which is, in turn, equivalent to saying that
the individual action ai is admitted by the team-directed intention.
Proof. First note that for anyprofile a ∈ Awehave thatS, a  [i prom]〈i stit〉[G prom]ϕ
if and only ifS, a  〈i stit〉[G prom]ϕ: since, by Proposition 1,  3[G prom]ϕ, we
have 3〈i stit〉[G prom]ϕ. Because [i stit] is an S5 operator, the 5 axiomandT
axiom derive 〈i stit〉[G prom]ϕ↔ [i stit]〈i stit〉[G prom]ϕ. Hence, these two
validities show that  3[i stit]〈i stit〉[G prom]ϕ. Therefore, again by Proposi-
tion 1, [i prom]〈i stit〉[G prom]ϕ is equivalent to [i stit]〈i stit〉[G prom]ϕ, which
is equivalent to 〈i stit〉[G prom]ϕ.
Secondly, recall that team-directed reasoning implies that individual agent
i first identifies a best combination that the group members can perform, say
a′G , and then decides to perform the individual action that is her part in that
combination, which is a′i. Hence, in the context of a collective intention to ϕ, for
any a ∈ A, the following are equivalent: (1) team-directed reasoning admits ai,
(2) there is an a′G−i ∈ AG−i such that (ai, a′G−i) is a best group action that the
group members can perform, (3) there is a a′−i ∈ A−i such that S, (ai, a′−i) 
[G prom]ϕ, and finally (4) S, a  〈i stit〉[G prom]ϕ. 
This result shows that the results of team-directed reasoning can be equally
well explained by team-directed intentions. Or, equivalently, it shows that an
important part of we-mode reasoning can be reduced to I-mode reasoning with
a team-directed intention. So, the effects of the agency transformation in team-
directed reasoning can be mirrored by the preference transformation in team-
directed intentions.
This connection shows that we need not focus on the mental processes by
which collective intentions are formed, because it suffices to study the mental
states of the members.30 Our result therefore complements the analysis by Gold
and Sugden (2007), who argue that team reasoning leads to collective inten-
tions:
30Compare Hakli et al. (2010, p. 299): “We study processes of we-reasoning concentrating on the
difference between we-mode reasoning and pro-group I-mode reasoning. The difference is not in
the aims of the agents because in both cases the agents aim at the benefit of the group. Rather, the
difference is in the reasoning process: It is individualistic in the I-mode case.”
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Team reasoning results in the formation of intentions. . . . references
to the group are noneliminable parts of the reasoning process that
led to the formation of the intention. Thus, it is natural to regard the
intentions that result from team reasoning as collective intentions.
(Gold and Sugden 2007, p. 126)
If all of this is correct, then the connection between team-directed intentions
and team-directed reasoning, established by our result, reveals that it is equally
natural to suppose that team-directed intentions are essential for collective in-
tentions. In line with the philosophical literature, this purports a relation be-
tween personal and collective intentionality. (Our analysis was the other way
around: we started by supposing a collective intention, only then analysing
which kind of intentions are supported by team-directed reasoning.)
Moreover, our reductionmoves team-directed reasoning into the ballpark of
preference transformations and dominance reasoning. Team-directed reason-
ing is supposed to fill a gap in traditional game and decision theory by adding
some kind of collectivistic method of reasoning, but our result shows that this
new reasoning method is not needed. After all, dominance reasoning coupled
with the preference transformation in team-directed intentions yields the same
action recommendations as team-directed reasoning.
5 Three I-mode we-intention types
Which individual attitudes are warranted in the context of a collective inten-
tion? In the following, our logical language is used to formalize and study three
types of we-intentions. To adequately conceptualize the intricate differences
between these we-intention types, they are meticulously represented by par-
ticular formulas in our logical language. As we have witnessed in the previous
section, such a detailed representation can bring about new conceptual insights
and thereby enhance our understanding of the subtleties in we-intentions. Our
running example to illustrate these types of we-intentions is displayed in Fig-
ure 5.
Suppose group G (= {i, j}) collectively intends to ϕ. A member i of G can
have various we-intentions that our formalism is able to distinguish. She could
adopt the collective goal as her own, instead of furthering her personal goals,
and pursue it to the best of her abilities, expressed by [i int]ϕ and coined a
pro-group intention. This way, she ignores the contributions others can make
and does her best to realize the collective intention regardless of what others
do. Various game-theoretic enterprises try to explain cooperative behaviour by
transforming the preferences of the groupmembers. Althoughwe do not study
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Figure 5: Strategic game model S4: a three-player game, where {i, j} = G col-
lectively intends to ϕ, showing only the intentions of i, j, and G, respectively.
its relation with such preference transformations, the same intuition underlies
this first we-intention type:
Definition 8 (Pro-group intentions). Suppose group G collectively intends to ϕ. Let
i ∈ G be a member of the group G. Agent i’s pro-group intention is an intention to
promote the group’s objective, which is to realize ϕ, that is, [i int]ϕ.
In game S4 of Figure 5, we observe that agents i and j would have the pro-
group intention if their intentions were represented by the third component of
the triple of intentions. We consider which individual actions would be admis-
sible if the agents were to adopt the pro-group intention: since S4, (s2, t2, u1) 2
ϕ and S4, (s1, t2, u1)  ϕ, we have s2 ϕ s1 and s1 ϕ s2. And, because
S4, (s3, t2, u1) 2 ϕ, we also have s3 ϕ s1. Likewise, by comparing (s1, t3, u1)
and (s3, t3, u1), we derive that s1 ϕ s3. Hence, if agent i adopted the pro-group
intention, only s1 and s3 would be admissible with respect to her intention. By
symmetry, if agent j adopted the pro-group intention, only t1 and t3 would be
admissible with respect to her intention.
Discontent with preference transformations, Bacharach, Sugden, and Gold
argue, on various occasions, that team-directed reasoning is more appropriate
for explaining and predicting cooperative behaviour. Instead, they propose an
agency transformation. When engaging in team-directed reasoning, a member
i of G first identifies a best combination of individual actions that the group
members can perform and then decides to perform the individual action that
is her part of that combination. According to our understanding (see Result 1),
this can be similarly explained by her adopting the (I-mode) we-intention to
perform an individual action that is her part of a best combination of actions
that the group members can perform, expressed by [i int]〈i stit〉[G prom]ϕ
and called a team-directed intention. An agent adopting a team-directed intention
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transforms her preferences and adopts as her personal objective performing an
individual action that is compatible with a best group action. This may require
her to put herself in the shoes of the group agent to determine the best group ac-
tions. Then she decides what to do by way of individualistic reasoning. That is,
she decides what to do by determining the individual actions that are admissi-
ble with respect to her team-directed intention. This way, the reasoning process
is left individualistic; only the content of her intention makes irreducible refer-
ence to the group. To make this section self-contained, we repeat the definition
of team-directed intentions:
Definition 7 (Team-directed intentions). Suppose group G collectively intends toϕ.
Let i ∈ G be a member of the group G. Individual agent i’s team-directed intention is
an intention to act compatiblywith a best group action, that is, [i int]〈i stit〉[G prom]ϕ.
Reconsider game S4 of Figure 5. First, note that, for the group G consisting
of agents i and j, (s1, t1), (s2, t1), and (s1, t2) are the only group actions that
are admissible with respect to ϕ. Indeed, since these are the only group actions
that ensure that ϕ is realized, these are the best group actions (see, for instance,
Proposition 1 item 6). Observe that, in S4, only agent i has the team-directed
intention. That is, agent i’s intention in S4 is represented by the individual
actions that are compatiblewith an admissible group action. It then follows that
only s1 and s2 are admissible with respect to agent i’s team-directed intention.
By symmetry, if agent j adopted the team-directed intention, only t1 and t2
would be admissible with respect to agent j’s team-directed intention.
Now we direct our attention to participatory intentions. Observing that
team-directed reasoning corresponds to I-modewe-intentions of the form [i int]〈i stit〉[G prom]ϕ
invites a natural objection. This objection originates from the oddity of using
three consecutivemodalities to express a team-directed intention. Team-directed
intentions merely require the members to perform an individual action that is
only compatiblewith a best group action. This is a veryweak demand. Therefore,
we introduce a third I-mode we-intention type: participatory intentions, which
require an individual agent to promote the realization of a best group action.
That is, she adopts as her objective that a best group action is performed and
then decides what to do by way of individualistic reasoning.
Definition 9 (Participatory intentions). Suppose group G collectively intends to ϕ.
Let i ∈ G be amember of the groupG. Agent i’sparticipatory intention is an intention
that the group promotes the group’s objective, which is to realize ϕ, regardless of what
others do, that is, [i int][G prom]ϕ.
Note the minor, yet crucial, difference: pro-group intentions require the in-
dividual agent to adopt the group’s objectives as her own,whereas a participatory
intention requires her to adopt as her personal objective that a best group action
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is performed. This reveals that participatory intentions can be viewed as a pref-
erence transformation. This preference transformation is not the result of the
aggregation of preferences, but crucially relies on group notions. After all, an
agent forming such a participatory intention is required to answer the question
“What should we do?” before being able to answer the question “What should
I do (with respect to my participatory intention)?”. The appeal to an agency
transformation in the team-directed-reasoning account is thus taken up by par-
ticipatory intentions. However, in contrast to altering the reasoning process, a
participatory intention alters the preferences.
Reconsider game S4 of Figure 5. Again, note that (s1, t1), (s2, t1), and (s1, t2)
are the only group actions that are admissible with respect to ϕ for the group
G consisting of agents i and j. Observe that, in S4, only agent j has the partic-
ipatory intention. It follows that the individual action t3 is incompatible with
a best group action, and that t1 dominates t2. Therefore, only t1 is admissi-
ble with respect to agent j’s participatory intention. By symmetry, if agent i
adopted the participatory intention, we derive that only s1 is admissible with
respect to agent i’s participatory intention.
In this section, we have introduced and discussed three we-intention types,
but why bother? Our discussions of game S4 illustrate that these three we-
intention types yield different action recommendations. If agent i adopted the
pro-group intention, then individual actions s1 and s3 would be admissible. If
instead she adopted the team-directed intention, then individual actions s1 and
s2 would be admissible. Finally, only individual action s1 would be admissible
if she adopted the participatory intention. This shows that there is a significant
difference between these three we-intention types.
6 An objection to team-directed reasoning
It may be thought that even though team-directed intentions and pro-group
intentions yield different action recommendations, they nonetheless yield the
same cooperative outcomes. In this section, we show that the alternative Hi-
Lo game illustrates that this is false. Since team-directed reasoning succeeds
in selecting cooperatively rational outcomes in this particular game whereas
pro-group intentions fail to do so, it might then be thought that team-directed
intentions surpass pro-group intentionswith regard to guaranteeing successful
cooperation in all scenarios. We show that this is also false. This means that
team-directed reasoning is on an unsatisfactory par with pro-group intentions.
The alternativeHi-Lo gameS3 of Figure 4 presents a scenario inwhich team-
directed intentions ensure successful cooperation. Pro-group intentions do not
fare well in that example: since neither individual action dominates the other
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Figure 6: Strategic model with intentions S5, where the group {i, j} = G collec-
tively intends to ϕ and both agents adopted the team-directed intention.
with respect to the group’s objective, both are admissible. Pro-group intentions
hence fail to dismiss all inferior group actions, for instance (high, low). We take
this to reveal that there are games in which pro-group intentions fail to explain
the obvious collective incentives, whereas team-directed reasoning succeeds.
There are, however, games revealing the opposite. In Game S5 of Figure 6,
team-directed intentions do not have much to offer: since group G’s actions
(U,L), (U,R), and (D,L) ensure ϕ, they are the best group actions in the con-
text of the collective intention to ϕ. So, any individual action is compatible with
a best group action. In particular, team-directed intentions admit D and R for
agents i and j respectively, and hence do not dismiss (D,R). Pro-group inten-
tions do not suffer from this flaw: they recommend U over D and L over R for
agents i and j, respectively. So, whereas team-directed intentions risk perform-
ing an inferior group action, namely (D,R), pro-group intentions guarantee
that a best group action is performed, namely (U,L). This illustrates that there
is a game in which team-directed reasoning fails to select cooperatively rational
outcomes whereas pro-group intentions succeed in doing so.
We agree with Bacharach (2006, p. 60, Section 8.3) that a theory should
only be determinate when our intuitions are. We should hence not presuppose
the determinacy of reason.31 The team-directed reasoning literature, however,
mostly presupposes that there is a unique best group action.32 Wedo notwish to
impose this restriction, and introduce a more general theory of cooperation.33
When dropping the uniqueness assumption, the above discussion reveals that
31In contrast, Harsanyi and Selten (1988, p. 13) write: “Clearly a theory telling us no more than
that the outcome can be any one of these equilibrium points will not give us much useful informa-
tion. We need a theory selecting one equilibrium point as the solution of the game.”
32As mentioned before, Bacharach (1999, p. 120 – adapted notation) is a notable exception: “I
shall say that agent i team reasons (for G) when she first computes a best profile a∗ (in terms of uG ),
next computes a∗i , and lastly decides to do a∗i because this is the component under her control of a
best profile.”
33Tamminga and Duijf (2017) have a similar spirit and “study a strong sense of joint action in
which members of a group, using team reasoning, design and then publicly adopt a group plan”.
Since such a group plan can be indeterminate, their focus is on “structural conditions that a group
plan must meet in order to successfully coordinate the individual actions of the group members”.
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team-directed reasoning does not surpass pro-group intentions.
Our discussion seems to contradict the result of Bacharach (1999, Theo-
rem 2), which is interpreted as showing that “team reasoning differs from, and
ismore powerful than, adopting the group’s objective and then reasoning in the
standard individualistic way” (p. 144).34 Our results are, however, mutually
consistent. The difference between our approach and Bacharach’s is the em-
ployed individualistic reasoning method: we adopt the admissibility require-
ment, which states that individuals reason in such a way as to avoid dominated
actions; Bacharach relies on equilibrium reasoning, which states that individu-
als determine an “individualistic best reply” (p. 127).
To summarize, we have discussed a game in which team-directed reasoning
is indeterminate whereas pro-group intentions yield a determinate cooperative
outcome. In fact, this establishes that team-directed intentions are on an equal
footing with pro-group intentions.
7 Participatory intentions prevail
The three we-intention types – pro-group, team-directed, and participatory in-
tentions (see Section 5) – have been introduced to predict and explain coopera-
tive behaviour and incentives. Herewe focus on their effectivenesswith regard to
guaranteeing that a best group action is performed. If these intention types have
anything to say about cooperation they should certainly advance best group ac-
tions across a wide range of games.35 We thus investigate the classes of games
for which these we-intention types guarantee that a best group action is per-
formed. The results of this section are collected in Figure 2 on page 6. As the
title of this section already reveals, we prove that our theory of participatory
intentions, in contrast with team-directed intentions or pro-group intentions,
is the prevalent account of cooperation.
Let us start by comparing team-directed intentions and pro-group inten-
tions. We will rephrase our discussion of the previous section. Recall that the
alternative Hi-Lo game (see Figure 4 on page 16) presents a scenario in which
team-directed intentions succeed in guaranteeing that a best group action is
performed whereas pro-group intentions fail to do so. In contrast, the discus-
sion of the game in Figure 6 has revealed that there are also scenarios in which
34Hakli et al. (2010, Thesis (3), p. 306) agree with Bacharach and write: “The we-mode tends to
create more collective order than the pro-group I-mode: It can decrease the amount of equilibria
but it cannot increase them.”
35Bacharach (2006, p. 58 – adapted notation) writes: “There are three requirements for a good
theory of why people play high in Hi-Lo: [. . . ] (iii) that it be part of a unified theory of a wide range
of problems, not just Hi-Lo–for example, all problems of cooperation.”
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pro-group intentions succeed in guaranteeing successful cooperation whereas
team-directed intentions fail to do so. This means that the class of games for
which team-directed intentions guarantee that a best group action is performed
is not a proper superset of the corresponding class for pro-group intentions, and
vice versa. So it is unclear which of these theories offers the best account of co-
operation. This results in a stalemate when we study the range of problems for
which they guarantee successful cooperation.
Result 2. Team-directed intentions and pro-group intentions are on a par with regard
to guaranteeing successful cooperation.
Now we turn to participatory intentions and team-directed intentions. It
seems uncontroversial to claim that whenever an individual agent decides to
perform an individual action that is incompatible with any best group action,
then she is certainly not promoting the realization of a best group action. In-
deed, this follows logically: (a) In the first part of the proof of Result 1 we show
that 〈i stit〉[G prom]ϕ entails [i prom]〈i stit〉[G prom]ϕ. (b) From items 1 and
4 of Proposition 1 it then follows immediately that
 [i prom][G prom]ϕ→ [i prom]〈i stit〉[G prom]ϕ.
Participatory intentions hence refine team-directed intentions’ action recom-
mendations.
Do participatory intentions guarantee that a best group action is performed
if team-directed intentions do? Suppose that we are considering a scenario in
which the following holds: when the agents adopt the team-directed intention
and therefore perform an individual action that is admissible with respect to it,
then ψ will hold. Since participatory intentions refine the action recommenda-
tions yielded by team-directed intentions, this means that if the agents adopted
the participatory intention, then ψ will also hold. This immediately implies
that whenever team-directed intentions guarantee that a best group action is
performed, then so do participatory intentions. In particular, this shows that
participatory intentions guarantee that a best group action is performed in sce-
narios in which there is a unique best group action, since team-directed inten-
tions are effective in those scenarios.
Let us briefly pause here. One of the main justifications for team-directed
reasoning is that it advances cooperative behaviour in Hi-Lo games. Whether
the cooperative incentives in theHi-Lo game actually lead to team-directed rea-
soning is not at issue. Team-directed reasoning sets out to address what makes
(high, high) the only rational option. As such, our theory of participatory inten-
tions is on an equal footing. After all, the action recommendations resulting
from team-directed reasoning coincide with those resulting from participatory
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intentions in the Hi-Lo game. This justification for the team-directed reasoning
account hence transfers to our theory of participatory intentions.
Result 3 (below) can be viewed as generalizing and strengthening this justi-
fication for our theory of participatory intentions. On a positive note, our result
establishes that whenever team-directed reasoning is successful in picking out
cooperatively rational solutions, then so are participatory intentions. On a neg-
ative note, there are scenarios in which team-directed reasoning fails in this
respect, whereas participatory intentions succeed.36 The team-directed reason-
ing account of cooperation is hence surpassed by our theory of participatory
intentions with regard to guaranteeing successful cooperation.
Result 3. Participatory intentions surpass team-directed intentions with regard to
guaranteeing successful cooperation.
Let us now turn to participatory intentions and pro-group intentions. Our
objection against team-directed reasoning and in favour of pro-group intentions
originates from game S5 in Figure 6. So, let us investigate how participatory in-
tentions fare in that game. Recall that, for group G, group actions (U,L), (U,R),
and (D,L) are the best group actions in the context of the collective intention
to ϕ. Since these coincide with the ϕ-worlds, the results of pro-group inten-
tions and participatory intentions coincide in this game. That is, the action rec-
ommendations yielded by these we-intention types are identical in this game.
In particular, this shows that participatory intentions champion the objection
posed to team-directed reasoning.
Can we come up with a different objection against participatory intentions,
in favour of pro-group intentions? That is, does a scenario exist in which par-
ticipatory intentions fail to guarantee that a best group action is performed
whereas pro-group intentions succeed in doing so? It is tempting to think that
the action recommendations yielded by participatory intentions refine those of
pro-group intentions. This is, however, not the case.37 Still, the answer to the
questions is negative: the following result shows that participatory intentions
also surpass pro-group intentions when it comes to guaranteeing successful
cooperation.38
Result 4. Participatory intentions surpass pro-group intentions with regard to guar-
anteeing successful cooperation.
36The discussion below shows that the game in Figure 6 is a case in point.
37To see this, imagine if we slightly change game S4 in Figure 5: drop ϕ at (s1, t2, u2) and thus
remove (s1, t2, u2) from IntG . One can check that if agent i adopted the pro-group intention, only
s1 and s3 would be admissible. In contrast, if agent i adopted the participatory intention, only s1
and s2 would be admissible. This example hence proves the point.
38Because the action recommendations of participatory intentions do not refine those of pro-
group intentions, the proof that participatory intentions surpass team-directed intentions is more
complicated than that of Result 3.
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To prove this result, we rely on the following lemma:
Lemma 1. Let S be an SMI. Let a ∈ A satisfy S, a  ∧j∈G [j prom][G prom]ϕ and
S, a 2 [i prom]ϕ. Then there is a profile b ∈ A satisfying:
1. S, (bi, a−i)  [i prom]ϕ
2. bi [G prom]ϕ ai
3. S, (bi, a−i) 
∧
j∈G [j prom][G prom]ϕ
Proof. Assume all the mentioned assumptions. Since S, a 2 [i prom]ϕ, there is a
b ∈ A satisfying bi ϕ ai and S, b  [i prom]ϕ. Hence, for any c−i ∈ A−i we have
that S, (ai, c−i)  ϕ implies S, (bi, c−i)  ϕ. Then for any c−i ∈ A−i we have
(bi, cG−i) ϕ (ai, cG−i). Hence for any c−i ∈ A−i we have that S, (ai, c−i) 
[G prom]ϕ implies S, (bi, c−i)  [G prom]ϕ. In other words, bi [G prom]ϕ ai.
Since S, a  [i prom][G prom]ϕ, this entails bi [G prom]ϕ ai, and S, (bi, a−i) 
[i prom][G prom]ϕ. To prove the third item, it remains to prove that for every
j ∈ G − i we have S, (bi, a−i)  [j prom][G prom]ϕ. This follows immediately
from the fact that the j-th component in (bi, a−i) equals that in a and the as-
sumption that S, a 
∧
j∈G [j prom][G prom]ϕ. 
Proof of Result 4. Let S = 〈N , (Ai), (IntH), pi〉 be an SMI. Suppose G collectively
intends toϕ, and suppose that pro-group intentions guarantee that a best group
action is performed. Let a ∈ A satisfy S, a  ∧i∈G [i prom][G prom]ϕ. Using the
previous lemma, we can show, by induction on the size of F := {j ∈ G | S, a 2
[j prom]ϕ}, that there is a b ∈ A satisfying (1) S, (bF , a−F ) 
∧
j∈G [j prom]ϕ
and (2) bj [G prom]ϕ aj for every j ∈ G. In light of the assumption that pro-
group intentions guarantee that a best group action is performed, (1) implies
S, (bF , a−F )  [G prom]ϕ. Using (2), this can be shown, by induction on the
size of F , to imply S, a  [G prom]ϕ. This shows that participatory intentions
guarantee that a best group action is performed. 
This result emphasizes that our theory of participatory intentions surpasses
team-directed reasoning and pro-group intentions in selecting cooperatively ra-
tional solutions. Indeed, in any scenario in which pro-group intentions guaran-
tee successful cooperation, participatory intentions do so too. So, to cooperate
successfully, it is generally better if all members take up the participatory inten-
tion.
Considered together, the results of this section purport that our theory of
participatory intentions, in contrast with team-directed reasoning or pro-group
intentions, is the prevalent account of cooperation. Since team-directed rea-
soning does not surpass pro-group intentions in some scenarios, this provides
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ample justification for our theory of participatory intentions beyond the team-
directed-reasoning account. After all, whereas team-directed reasoning sur-
passes pro-group intentions with regard to guaranteeing successful coopera-
tion only in some scenarios, participatory intentions surpass both in all scenar-
ios. Our theory of participatory intentions therefore best explains and predicts
cooperation.
8 Discussion
The team-directed-reasoning account of cooperation (as studied by Bacharach,
Sugden, and Gold) has been criticized on two counts: first, team-directed rea-
soning is supposed to transcend traditional game and decision theory by adopt-
ing a certain collectivistic reasoning method. However, we have shown that
an important part of we-mode reasoning reduces to I-mode reasoning with a
particular preference expressed by the team-directed intention. That is, the ac-
tion recommendations yielded by team-directed reasoning coincide with those
yielded by team-directed intentions. This moves team-directed reasoning into
the domain of preference transformations coupled with dominance reasoning.
Traditional game and decision theory can thus explain team-directed reasoning
as a particular preference transformation.
Secondly, we have shown that the team-directed-reasoning account does not
surpass pro-group intentions in selecting cooperatively rational solutions. Sim-
ilar to traditional preference transformation theories, pro-group intentions re-
quire an individual agent to adopt the group’s objective as her own. These pro-
group intentions are on a par with team-directed intentions. That is, in some
scenarios that lack a unique best group action, pro-group intentions succeed
in selecting a cooperatively rational solution, whereas team-directed intentions
fail to do so. The class of games for which team-directed intentions guarantee
successful cooperation is hence not a proper superset of the corresponding class
for pro-group intentions, and vice versa. So it is unclear which of these theo-
ries offers the best account of cooperation. This results in a stalemate when we
study the range of problems for which they guarantee successful cooperation.
Reform is required.
This deadlock is resolved by our theory of participatory intentions: a partic-
ipatory intention requires a member to promote the realization of a best group
action, regardless of what others do. Participatory intentions’ action recom-
mendations refine those of team-directed intentions, because the latter require a
member to act only compatibly with a best group action. This entails that in any
scenario in which team-directed intentions guarantee successful cooperation,
participatory intentions do so too. In contrast, participatory intentions do not
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refine the action recommendations yielded by pro-group intentions. Nonethe-
less, in any scenario in which pro-group intentions guarantee that a best group
action is performed, participatory intentions do so too. Our theory of partici-
patory intentions thus overcomes the deadlock and is the prevalent account of
cooperation.
Alternatively, since we focus solely on the third stage of we-mode reason-
ing,39 one could view our study as attempting to understand the logical form
of the we-intentions resulting from team-directed reasoning. The logical ma-
chinery helps to address this question more precisely than what has been done
before. We revise the theory by showing that we-mode reasoning at the third
stage may be improved by taking these resulting we-intentions to be participa-
tory intentions rather than team-directed intentions.
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